‘Race in the Ontology of International Order’ by Branwen Gruffydd Jones examines through the use of critical realism the concepts of race and racism that has infected the structures of society and the International Order through the perpetuation of four interlinked social dimensions and the global dominance of capitalism. Branwen Gruffydd Jones argues that race is overlooked because of the Empirical method which dominates mainstream international relation (IR) studies. She perceives two main issues within Empiricalism which reduce its effectiveness. Firstly,” …it reduces racism to phenomena of agency and behaviour seen as aberrant to the normal social order.” (Jones, 2008:909)(Wight, 2003), which generally restricts analyses to individual societies rather than international. Secondly, the focus on institutional form of the state and the ahistorical treatment of the state and sovereignty, thus Empiricalism, “…systematically overlooks the historical relationship between different state forms and processes of state formation…” (Jones, 2008:909)(Krishna, 2001). Branwen Gruffydd Jones instead suggests using critical realism, an approach that uses ‘depth ontology’ to distinguish the realm of real entities, the realm of actual events and the realm of the empirical and assess their causal powers using stratification or stratified ontology, which looks at how the effects of a stratified effect can effect another. Branwen Gruffydd Jones believes analyses through this process is necessary to combat the concept that the dimensions of race in the international order, “… goes beyond the discursive realm and includes non-ideational structural dimensions… which is socially produced and reproduced.” (Jones, 2008:916).
Racism is traditionally understood by IR as discursive and agential phenomena. While important, racial oppression is also the, “…form of unequal social power in society.” (Jones, 2008:916) created and reproduced through intentional acts and structural forces from the configuration of social relationships (Jones, 2008:916). Bhaskar defines these four dimensions of social being as material transactions with nature (the ontological situation people are in), social relations (groups of people communicating with other groups), interpersonal relations (communication between individuals) and the realm of Jones,
subjectivity (a person’s individual epistemological decisions) (Bhaskar, 1993:160-161). They are, “interrelated and interacting but ontologically distinct and non-reducible.” Jones, 2008:916).
Alone these dimensions of social being do not create the notions of race or racism, according to Jones, rather the capitalist notion of ‘private property’ embedded into society does, and the dimensions just circulate it. The uneven global distribution of property and power was created through long historical processes of appropriation of land and labour power which form the foundation for capitalist accumulation. Generally, the processes of dispossession were perpetrated by people of European descent against non-Europeans and were formerly legitimized by a, “…variety of legal doctrines incorporating racial ideologies asserting the superiority of European religion, culture and civilization…” such as Terra Nullius in Australia (Jones, 2008:919). Thus the time of colonialism and imperialism created new local and global social orders with new ‘property relations’ founded on racialised dispossession (Jones, 2008:922). Post-colonialism former colonised nations defined as the ‘South’ continue their colonised objectives, to provide, cheap labour, export raw materials and to import manufactured ‘North’ products (Jones, 2008:923). Therefore the historical development of capitalism as a global system has created the current global structure of the ‘North’ and ‘South’ (Jones, 2008:923). Branwen Gruffydd Jones thus argues that racialised social inequality is routinely reproduced as a direct result of, “…structures persevered through non-racial institutions and legal orders of private property.” (Jones, 2008:924).
Jones’s argument suggests that racism primarily was created during colonial, imperial time from concepts of ‘private property’ and capitalism, however, racial discrimination was occurring before this time. The Greeks often depicted on pottery and art all but Greeks wearing clothes, an indication that non-Greeks were different and less trustworthy; the Roman Empire was bringing civilisation to the barbarians, but only Romans could be part of the senate; and the many dynasties of China saw only the ‘middle kingdom’ as the centre of the world (Isaac, 2006:53,253). Thus as Vorster, Hudson and McWhorter argue racial discrimination could simply be a product of human nature and the fear of difference rather than a result of capitalism (Vorster, 2002)(Hudson, 2004:308)
This article would thus be beneficial to those attempting to understand the concepts of race and racism and how historical actions have shaped the International Order or as an example for greater research using different research methodology. Branwen Gruffydd Jones in her article ‘Race in the Ontology of International Order’ argues that the racialised structures of social power developed through centuries of colonial dispossession remain entrenched in modern institutions of international order through a critical realism perspective (Jones,2008). Her historical critique is sound and helps ‘open the shutters’ of continued race and racism; however, it arguably stops too early in colonial times and primarily blames capitalism for the concept of race and racism, which is perhaps a too simplistic approach to the vast problem of race and racism.
References
Bhaskar, R. 1993. Dialectic: The Pulse of Freedom. London: Verso
Branwen G. 2008. Race in the Ontology of International Order. Political Studies 56: 907-927.
Hudson N. 2004. ‘Hottentots’ and the evolution of European racism. Journal of European Studies December 2004. 34: 308-33
Isaac, B. 2006. The Invention of Racism in Classical Antiquity. Princeton University Press. US. 53 & 253.
Krishna, S. 2001. Race, Amnesia and the Education of International Relations. Alternatives, 26 (4), 401-424.
McWhorter, L. 2010. Racism, Eugenics, and Ernst Mayr’s Account of Species. Philosophy Today. Recentering of Continental Philosophy: Selected Studies.54 : 200-207.
Wight, C. 2003. The Agent-Structure Problem and Institutional Racism. Political Studies, 51 (4), 706-21.
Vorster, J.M. 2002. Racism, Xenophobia and Human Rights. The Ecumenical Review, 54: 296–312.