The United States of America and the People’s Republic of China are often portrayed as being as close to one another as the Soviet Union and the United States in the Cold War, however, strong common interests in the Asia-Pacific region arguable make the notion of strategic rivalry impossible, and has recently seen the United States and China visually showing unity.
Economically, both countries are closely entwined, like much of the globalised world, and simply require each other for continued internal and global prosperity. Similarly, both the United States (US/America) and the People’s Republic of China (PRC/China) want security to ensure the Asia-Pacific region remains relatively stable for both economical and political reasons. Finally, it should also be noted that most international nations oppose any serious strategic rivalry between the US and the PRC as most want to avoid being dragged into another international conflict, retain global economic stability and to prevent the use of nuclear actions. Thompson (2010) and Subramanian are a couple of the commentators who disagree with the notion that these common interests could prevent the US and the PRC from engaging in serious strategic rivalry as their individual interests overlap and oppose each other to a greater extent than the common interests which bind them. Glaser (2011), Wang (2007) and Hill (2005) disagree with these commentators with the definitive argument that economical and security of the Asia-Pacific region overrides any disagreements, as they are the primary concepts and concerns that uphold modern nations.
A large portion of the Chinese economy relies upon exporting goods manufactured by low-cost labour to foreign markets and outsourcing cheap labour to foreign businesses (Hill, 2005:60). The obvious importance of retaining the United States which is one of the largest importers of Chinese goods in the world and utilises Chinese cheap labour for production is evident (Hill, 2005:60)(Kamm, 1990:66)(Bresnan, 1994:14), as without the US, China would be forced to search for new trade partners or else face a weakened economy. In 1990, John Kamm elaborated on why the US needs China’s trade, the US in 1980 made a trade pact with the PRC, Kamm explained that within ten years US companies had invested heavily into China’s manufacturing industry, and that any closure of free trade with China would result in tariffs rising to, “…70% from 12% for dolls, to 110% from 14% for watchbands…” and 35% from 6% for made-in-China sweaters, which would result in large amounts of ‘bad debt’ most held by US investors and US Banks (1990:66). Although China has taken control back of much of its manufacturing industry, the US has many companies which have heavily invested in Chinese ventures (Noland, 2009:181). Thus the resulting outcome of conflict between China and the United States would be ‘bad debt’ held by the US once again, something presumably US multinational investors would rather be without (Noland, 2009:181). Prominently over the past five years US financial weakness has stripped large amounts of capital from the United States’ largest banks. This eventually led to a liquidity crisis which desperately required capital injection. China, with more than two trillion dollars of foreign reserves, was in a unique position to help finance US capital markets (Li, 2009)(Tan, 2011:211). China bought approximately one trillion dollars of the 4.45 trillion dollars of foreign US debt (Easton, 2009). This shows China’s commitment to helping the US economically grow or at least stabilise. Easton argues this is due to both China owning so much of US debt and also to retain the US as an importer of Chinese goods as a collapse would see China losing a lot of money and potential money from trade (2009). This exposure to potential financial or political risk should foreign banks stop buying US Treasury securities or start selling them heavily was addressed in a June 2008 report issued by the Bank of International Settlements, which stated, “Foreign investors in U.S. dollar assets have seen big losses measured in dollars, and still bigger ones measured in their own currency” (Easton, 2009). Similarly, Secretary of State Hilary Clinton in a trip to Asia, argued that the US and China were, “in the same boat,” and that both countries needed to cooperate to overcome the global economic crisis (Tan, 2011:232). The US can ill afford to alienate China, even past the brunt of the global financial crisis as besides needing the country to buy more U.S. goods, the U.S. will depend on Beijing to help fund $9 trillion in deficits it will produce over the next decade (Easton, 2009).
The US, although many Chinese dignitaries are unlikely to suggest, greatly helps stabilise and secure the Asia-Pacific region both politically and economically. Historically, the US promise to secure Japan and by extending its ‘nuclear umbrella’, the United States deterred the Soviet Union and prevented the cultural and natural competition for influence in East and South East Asia from turning into a destabilising regional arms race (The Economist, 1995:16). Japan became secure enough to continue building democracy and growing, while its neighbours, were reassured that their sovereignty would not be threatened again by Japan (The Economist, 1995:16). The US’s current numerous actions against Chinese rampart growth as a dominant power in the Asia-Pacific region, such as the hub-and-spoke policy, forward military deployment and regional constraint diplomatic actions are keeping the Asia-Pacific region relatively stable and thus economically prosperous in a similar fashion to the US’s involvement with Japan after World War II (Noland,2009:185) (Ross,1999:83)(Twining, 2007). Similarly, the US’s ‘third pillar strategy’ outlined by Daniel Twining’s (2007) “America’s Grand Design in Asia” indicates that the US is supporting and growing Asia-Pacific powers to prevent them from being ‘dominated’ by China. The US involvement with Japan and similar relations with other Asia-Pacific nations creates stability as nations feel safer under the protection of the ‘global policeman’ (the United States) (Dujarric:2005:445). The threat that other nations, particularly China, could annex or reduce their individual absolute sovereignty in the region is null and void as the US is there to ‘prevent’ that situation (Goh, 2008). Hill (2005:60) argues that this is in fact beneficial to China, as although this prevents China from being politically dominant it does create new potential reliable trade partners, able to compete to a similar degree as China. This makes them economically a more reliable long term trading partner able to buy more imports and from China (Hill,2005:60).
According to Wang (2007) stability in the Asia-Pacific is so important to China because as “…the Chinese economy rapidly expanded, it became more dependent on international trade and began to prioritize stable diplomatic relations in order to ensure economic growth.” This has led to China becoming increasingly dependent on its neighbours in the Asia-Pacific region for resources, security and support. Resulting in the Asian economy becoming intertwined with China’s development which ultimately also effects US foreign investment in the Asia-Pacific (Wang, 2007:38).
Finally, the United States and China’s interest in avoiding mutually assured destruction via nuclear weapons ensures the avoidance of strategic military rivalry. Elbridge Colby suggests the US’s and China’s stockpile of nuclear weapons create an equal playing field between the United States and China, as neither side can currently avoid the consequences of nuclear war (2007:414). Archarya (2006:155) questions whether nuclear weapons will ever be used even in an unlikely war between the United States and China, however, Elbridge Colby argues that the uncertainty is the strongest defence and that “The Cold War experience shows that such defensive demands backed by believable threats can stave off attacks….”(Colby, 2007: 415). Charles Glaser (2011) agrees as, “…even if Chinese power were to greatly exceed U.S. power…” the United States would, “…still be able to maintain nuclear forces that could survive any Chinese attack and threaten massive damage in retaliation…” and the same defensive advantage applies to China as well, as, “…although China is currently much weaker than the United States militarily, it will soon be able to build a nuclear force that meets its requirements for deterrence.” (Glaser:2011:86).
Thompson (2010) and Subramanian (2011) believe China’s peaceful rise will not be particularly peaceful and will result in a near uni-polar world dominated by China. Thompson justifies this argument with China’s ability to challenge the US within the Asia-Pacific region due to its massive military spending, “…to modernize its armed forces.” and the realist argument that more strength means more ability to pursue its interests assertively, which will cause other countries to counter (2010). Subramanian (2011) adds that the US will fall rather due to its inability to compete with China on an economic scale based upon current economic predictions (2011:66-78).
Glaser (2011) contrastingly argues that, “…China’s unique qualities, past behaviour, and economic trajectory may well turn out to be less important in driving future events than many assume — because how a country acts as a superpower and whether its actions and those of others will end in battle are shaped as much by general patterns of international politics as by idiosyncratic factors.”(Glaser, 2011:80). He argues that China’s rise does not need to be as, “competitive and dangerous as the standard realist argument suggests…” as current international conditions such as nuclear deterrents should allow, “…the US and China to protect their vital interests without posing large threats to each other.” (Glaser, 2011:81). Wang agrees to the concept of China rising peacefully, however, he adds an argument founded upon a basis for the survival of the Chinese Communist Party, “…the legitimacy and ultimate survival of the CCP rests on economic growth that is highly dependent on trade, foreign investments, and access to natural resources and foreign technology… as a result of these strong economic incentives, Chinese foreign policy will largely remain pragmatic and diplomatic.” (Wang, 2007:41). Glaser (2011) and Wang (2007) thus argue that the outcome of China’s rise is less based upon the inevitable pressures of the international system than on how the leaders of China and the US manage and communicate (Glaser, 2011:84). As Glaser explains a, “Conflict is not predetermined-and if the United States can adjust to the new international conditions…” make, “…some uncomfortable concessions and not…” exaggerate, “…the dangers, a major clash might well be avoided.” (Glaser, 2011:84). Mahbubani (2005) similarly, proposes that, “…states no longer need to pursue military conquest to prosper, the theory goes; trade and economic integration pave a surer path to growth..” than military conquest (Mahbubani, (2005:49).
China also benefits from cooperation and friendship with the United States because unsurprisingly, China as Cao Xin suggests “…doesn’t have a real friend in the world…”(2011). According to Xin, the Middle East officials complain that China is afraid to take clear stances in Middle Eastern affairs; China’s most important strategic partner, Russia, is the provider of arms to many smaller Asian nations that China is having territorial sovereignty disputes with; and the ‘Eurozone’ arguably remains one of the United States firmest allies and opposes actions taken by the Chinese government upon its own citizens, regardless of how much China actively invests in the continent (Xin, 2011). China’s fundamental problem, Xin argues is that a, “…guiding ideology of China’s diplomatic practise…” is that, “…more attention is paid to saving face than gaining concrete returns.” (Xin, 2011). He gives the example, that diplomatic personnel attach much more importance to domestic propaganda back home than offering any real help to its citizens abroad (Xin, 2011). Xin suggest China’s diplomatic ideology does not reflect China’s actual position diplomatically. They argue that China’s thinking is that of a, “…mid-level player in a multi-polar world trying to keep a low profile…” rather than the country with the second highest GDP in the world. Everlyn Goh (2008) and John Bresnan (1994) suggest that on the international level the recognized principle is strength thus when China abstains from voting on the United Nation’s Security Council, generally internationally it is considered unclear; that it does not uphold international justice; protects its citizens; or defends its national interests (Xin, 2011). Dr Fred Bergesten, Director of the Peterson Institute for International Economics, suggests that ideally, China and the United States need to become self-interested co-operators, they should move “…toward an informal G-2 where the U.S. and China will start to come to a meeting of the minds…” and align their position towards world affairs particularly Asia-Pacific affairs (Bergeston in Xin, 2011).
It is unlikely that the Chinese government will stray from its current path of cooperation and accommodation, and similarly, it is unlikely the US will engage in anything greater than mild constraining tactics against China’s rise, as both nations have similar overarching interests in the economy, security and survival in the world and the Asia-Pacific region. Ultimately for China if its relationships with the world diminish to the point that foreign trade and investments disappear then the current economic trajectory of growth and stability of China would vanish. Wang argues that in this case the, “…restless and dispossessed workers, peasants, and students…” would be unleashed upon the central government. The Chinese Communist Party (in China) obviously frown upon this notion and will ensure there is regional and global stability and plenty of avenues to globally trade to ensure future prosperity and the continuation of China’s growth. Wang expresses this as, “A stable, peaceful, and pragmatic China benefits the whole world, but, the “peaceful rise” of China faces many difficult challenges ahead as it struggles to balance the demands of an ever more nationalistic populace with the need to maintain rational foreign policies”(Wang, 2007:41). The United States similarly, requires China for its own economic survival and potentially as an ally in global security in the future multi-polar world (Hill, 2005:60)(Easton,2009).
The simple and common interests the United States of America and the People’s Republic of China have in common globally and in the Asia-Pacific region that discourage strategic rivalry are basic economics combined with stability, security and the option of avoiding mutually assured destruction, from nuclear weapons.
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