{"id":17,"date":"2014-03-03T11:47:21","date_gmt":"2014-03-03T11:47:21","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/lindsay.mengel.com.au\/?p=17"},"modified":"2014-03-03T11:52:44","modified_gmt":"2014-03-03T11:52:44","slug":"agents-structures-in-contemporary-capitalism","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"http:\/\/lindsay.mengel.com.au\/?p=17","title":{"rendered":"Agents & Structures in Contemporary Capitalism"},"content":{"rendered":"

Do agents have constitutive power in determining how the social and political world functions in contemporary capitalism?<\/em><\/p>\n

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Agents have constitutive power in determining how the social and political world functions in contemporary capitalism to an extent because of the dialectical relationship between agents and structures. This notion of agents having constitutive power in contemporary capitalism is ultimately an agent verse structure debate on power or who has the most power with contemporary capitalism being the structure and agents being agents.\u00a0 Dahl\u2019s (1957), Bachrach, Baratz (1963) and Lukes (1974) define power as having the capacity to achieve what one wants, potentially to the detriment of others, however, agents and structures arguably in the post-modern world exist together in such a state that neither are dominant as can be seen from the attempted reformation of American\u2019s financial regulation after the Global Financial Crisis. This essay thus argues that agents and structures are equal when it comes to constitutive power in social and political functions in contemporary capitalism because they are dialectical and mutually constitutively dependent.<\/p>\n

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The agent-structure debate is potentially the most important theoretical issue within the human sciences, but has only slowly impacted political science (Archer, 1995)(Giddens, 1984).\u00a0 The study of politics in fact largely concerns conceptions of power; \u2018who gets what, when and how.\u2019 (Lasswell, 1937). Colin Hay (1995) argues that, \u201cevery time we construct, however tentatively, a notion of social, political or economic causality we appeal, whether explicitly or implicitly, to ideas about structure and agency.\u201d (1995:189) thus there is no escape from the structure-agency debate.<\/p>\n

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To determine whom or what has constitutive power, power must first be defined. Power in its most basic form is examined by Dahl (1957) and is later defined by Lukes (1974) as the first dimension of Power as \u201cA has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would otherwise not do.\u201d\u00a0 (Dahl, 1957:2002-203). This results in overtly, measurable and quantifiable outcomes from A\u2019s \u2018side\u2019 winning a conflict by influencing, forcing, persuading or deceiving B\u2019s \u2018side\u2019 (Dahl, 1957)(Lukes, 1974). As a theoretical tool this has limited applicability because of the \u2018winners\u2019 and\/or \u2018losers\u2019 not always being apparent in the results and the ignorance of agenda setting power or conflict which has not reached the overt stage (Polsby, 1963).<\/p>\n

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Bachrach and Baratz in Lukes second dimension of power argue that power has two dimensions an overt conflict (as expressed by Dahl) and a covert, suppressed agenda setting dimension (Bachrach, 1962). Bachrach and Baratz express this as \u201cA devotes his energies to creating or reinforcing\u2026values and institutional practices that limit the scope of the political process to public consideration of only those issues\u2026innocuous to A.\u201d (1962:948). The second dimension of power thus argues that \u2019some issues are organized into politics while others are organized out\u2019 (Schattschneider 1960: 71) through concepts such as dominant rules, framing of an issue, manipulation of structures or the discrediting of oppositional agents. The second dimension, similarly to the first, only reveals the discourse and ignores the gaps and silences of a situation, thus actors must articulate preferences and grievances for conflict to take place because conflict is the key, according to the first and second dimension, to power due to its decision making framework (Polsby, 1963)(Hinson, 2003).<\/p>\n

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The third and final dimension of power was developed by Lukes and examines the structural powers that can manipulate agents, either through agential use or simple existence (Lukes, 1974:27). In this form of power A,\u201d\u2026exercises power over [B] by influencing, shaping or determining his [her] very wants\u2019 (Lukes 1974, 27). This structural power stems from how capitalist societies are organized; it is entrenched into society\u2019s psyche and directs people into certain modes of behaviour.\u00a0 Hinson and Healey (2003:4) further writes that this form of power \u201cis exercised in part through control of the institutions that shape and create meaning: religious institutions, the media, television, mass consumer culture, popular ideas about government and about workers and bosses, etc.\u201d Sandra Hinson and Richard Healey (2003: 5) suggest this influence is achievable because of the psychosomatic feeling of \u2018powerlessness\u2019 thrust upon most individuals outside political decision making groups. \u201cWhen those who have the power to name and to socially construct reality choose not to see you or hear you \u2026 when someone with the authority of a teacher, say, describes the world and you are not in it, there is a moment of psychic disequilibrium, as if you looked in the mirror and saw nothing. It takes some strength of soul \u2014 and not just individual strength but collective understanding \u2014 to resist this void, this non-being, into which you are thrust, and to stand up, demanding to be seen and heard.\u201d (Hinson, 2003:5). Thus the third dimension acknowledges the existence of overt and covert decision making but suggests \u2018decisions\u2019 do not always exist because the structural powers impose norms and a framework to work within (Hinson, 2003).<\/p>\n

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Within the agent-structure debate there are three key issues one ontological and the other two epistemological.\u00a0 The ontologically issue, \u201c\u2026concerns the nature of both agents and structures\u2026 because they are in some way mutually implicating, of their interrelationship.\u201d (Wendt, 1987:339). Thus the ontological issue questions what approach or approaches are most appropriate to exist within, in an agent against structure debate. There are three categorical solutions to this ontological problem: agential, structural and \u2018combinational\u2019 which lead to the epistemologically issue and solution.\u00a0 There are two epistemological issues, \u201c\u2026the first is the choice of the form of explanation corresponding respectively to agents and structures\u2026\u201d and secondly the, \u201capproaches that conceive of human beings as nothing more than complex organisms processing stimuli general agent-explanations that are more mechanistically causal in form.\u201d (Wendt, 1987:339).<\/p>\n

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The agential approach or individualism expounds that the effects, outcomes and events are based upon actors or individuals in society, not structures (Hay, 1995). This approach would suggest that structures such as contemporary capitalism are intangible and consequently are un-provable. Epistemologically, this implies that structures cannot be used to explain the behaviour of individuals or agents (Loyal and Barnes, 2001). Giddens suggest that agents are players and thus possess causal power that can be used at their discretion hence their actions action or agency is defined as, \u201c\u2026the stream of actual or contemplated causal interventions of corporeal beings in the ongoing process of events-in-the-world.\u201d (1976:75). An agents measure of power thus resides in his or her choice to act. Intentionalism is a form of agential focus that attempts to remove structure from a political context. Intentionalism, instead, argues that political outcomes can be explained by the intentions of agents. According to Loyal and Barnes (2001) Intentionalism proposes society exists in an anarchical environment that has been developed and devised by agents or that society exists in individualistic creations. Intentionalism is associated with two main movements, chronocentrism and contextual parochialism (Hay, 1995). Chronocentrism or presentism is an egotism that suggests individuals focus upon the moment as their actions are important (Standage, 2007:256). Likewise, contextual parochialism is to avoid generalization as all political and social phenomena are inimitable because actors are chronocentric and individualistic. Intentionalism thus suggests that agents are free thinking, individualistic \u2018creators\u2019 of society and have constitutive power that can only be removed by other \u2018creators\u2019.<\/p>\n

The structural solution or structuralism suggests political effects, outcomes and events based upon structural factors such as contemporary capitalism. Structuralism would argue that the structures of a state or contextual arena generate state actors. Agents are therefore just embodiments of the structure or the situated human actor (Archer, 1995).<\/p>\n

Rational choice theory and new institutionalism are relevant to this style of thought. Rational choice assumes individuals are egoistic and self regarding; will prioritize utility maximization; behave instrumentally rationally; and have a clear, near-perfect knowledge of their contextual environment (Heine, 2000). Thus rational choice would suggest that because contemporary capitalism remains the same structural context, different agents will act in the same instrumentally rational utility-maximising way (Heine, 2000). Therefore actors do not have constitutive power because they are controlled and created by the context of capitalism. New institutionalism, on the other hand, emphasizes the process in which institutions constrain and mediate behavior.<\/p>\n

Institutions or structures are the products of history, founded and set in a direction. Key components of institutions remain in play since its creation, and are very difficult to change (Heine, 2000). Structures according to new institutionalist thought normalise behaviour and influences agential ideas, agents in turn come to conform to their new \u2018normalised\u2019 behaviour (Heine, 2000)(Hay, 1995)(Taylor,1989)(. This is in contrast to rational choice theory\u2019s argument that agents are \u2018born\u2019 into a structure and thus inherit its norms. Finally, institutions enable actors to realise goals by generation of a means to accomplish them, however, the realised goals are the quintessence of institutions (Heine, 2000) (Dahl, 1961).<\/p>\n

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Structural Marxists and feminists, have a similar structuralist view. Structural Marxists would argue that class brought about by capitalism determines human action and decisions (Heine, 2000)(Berg, 1980) while structural feminists, similarly, would suggest gender is the key controlling structure (Heine, 2000). The superstructure and substructure, which society is composed upon, are controlled by the \u2018set structures\u2019 (capitalism, gender, etcetera). Thus individuals may make their own history, but not through their own choices, but by the overarching structure the individuals are within.<\/p>\n

Structuralist approaches such as rational choice, new institutionalism, structural Marxists and structural feminists have three key critiques, which do not refute structuralism but rather creates difficulty in the notion. Structuralism is arguably logically inconsistent for example, how can an agent who is dominated by structures express this argument. Similarly, structuralist theories such as structural Marxism suggests the concept of a \u2018false consciousness\u2019, only the enlightened can escape from and see the structures, which seems more religious than scientific. Finally, structuralism does not recognize the importance that agents make history and arguably the structures or institutions in the contemporary world. Agents that have created a structure or history ultimately influence, although not finally, the direction a structure or institution will proceed in. For example, Karl Marx\u2019s notion of Marxism and criticism of capitalism remains firm in Marxism and within similar theories, although potentially not precisely how Marx may have wished.<\/p>\n

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Loyal and Barnes argue the key differences between structures and agents is choice, \u201c\u2026agency stands for \u2018the freedom of the contingently acting subject over and against the constraints that are thought to derive from enduring social structures. To the extent that human beings have agency, they may act independently of and in opposition to structural constraints, and\/or may (re)constitute social structures through their freely chosen actions. To the extent that they lack agency, human beings are conceived of as automata, following the dictates of social structures and exercising no choice in what they do.\u201d (Loyal, 2001:507).<\/p>\n

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The combinational solutions are theories that, \u201c\u2026try and transcend the dualism of structure and agency.\u201d (McAnulla, 1998). These theories suggest that rather than representing different phenomena the structures and agents are mutually dependent and inherently related (McAnulla, 1998). Structures exist through agency but actors have rules and limitations defined by norms and other structural influences that influence their agency. Furthermore, these actions can influence the reconstitution of the structure thus affecting future agential actions (Giddens, 1984)(Taylor, 1989:124). Gidden\u2019s metaphor for this duality is that structures and agents are two sides of the same coin (1993:257). His dialectical theory of structuration thus, \u201c\u2026provide[s] an account of human agency which recognizes that human beings are purposive actors, who virtually all the time know what they are doing and why. At the same time that actions of each individual are embedded in social contexts \u2018stretching away\u2019 from his or her activities and which causally influence their nature.\u201d (Giddens, 1984:258). Jessop\u2019s theoretical approach, known as strategic-relational, takes Gidden\u2019s amalgamation a step further. He defines structures and agents as theoretical abstractions that are relational and dialectical (Jessop,1990). Thus rather than being two sides of the same coin, they are the two alloys that are the coin (Hay, 1995). Jessop suggests agents engage in \u2018strategic action\u2019 that produces results in different \u2018strategically selective contexts\u2019 within which actions are designed and impact on future contexts. Thus it brings the notion of agency into structure and structure into agency, structured context and contextually-grounded agent (Jessop, 1990).<\/p>\n

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Taylor suggests that these approaches\u2019s one flaw is the mutual power of structure and agent. He disputes that this notion emphasizes reflexivity and assumes influence of structure and awareness of existence but also a significant implicit degree of self-awareness on the part of actors (Taylor, 1989:124).<\/p>\n

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Structures and agents have equal constitutive power in determining how the social and political world functions because of their relational and dialectical connection. The attempted reforms of Wall Street by the United States government after the Global Financial Crisis exemplify the mutual power relationship between agents and structures in a contemporary capitalist context. The agents of this phenomenon were not freely making their decisions independently of structures, however, the structures were not wholly influencing the created decisions.<\/p>\n

In 2010, the United States (US) government unveiled and passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (2010) which was designed to bring sweeping reform to the regulatory system of Wall Street to prevent another Global Financial Crisis. Since passing, lawyers and lobbyists from those within the financial institutions of the US have been fighting every line possible (Rolling Stone, 2012), which is representative of Dahl\u2019s (1957), Bachrach and Baratz (1962) dimensions of overt and covert power decisional and non decision approach to power. From an agency perspective there was clearly two actors within this phenomenon; the United State government and their Wall Street opposition. The US government (comprised of individual agents, such as Barack Obama) was clearly attempting to manage and prevent future cataclysmic financial crises. Similarly, Wall Street and other financial institutions was (and are) fighting regulations which would impede their financial endeavors (Scott, 2006:2). \u00a0There is also clearly a structural side of this phenomenon as Wall Street and even the US government could be argued to be under the influence of the political economy of capitalism within the US (Scott, 2006).<\/p>\n

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Giddens structuration approach arguably provides more plausible and sufficient justification of the power struggles behind the US financial reforms because it takes into account all the factors involved, rather than just the structural or agential. The political economy of capitalism found within the US is a product of continued agency of capitalist thought, thus structural arguments of permanence by Rational Choice theorists are invalid.\u00a0 The US government is comprised of powerful individuals, with tremendous resources, influence and the state ability to call upon force, yet they participated within the frameworks of market mechanisms and the political economy of capitalism. Arguably, the US government could have acted differently, such as through top down governance, but chose to utilize market mechanisms because of how deeply the contemporary capitalist system is embedded into society. Thus power was mutually divided between the US government and the structures of contemporary capitalism, because the US government had the capacity to achieve numerous different goals in relation to the financial reforms, but chose to continue using the norms of contemporary capitalism, which in turn supports and continues their existence.<\/p>\n

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The attempted reforms by the US government after the Global Financial Crisis demonstrates the mutual constitutive power agents and structures have in shaping social and political world function in contemporary capitalism.\u00a0 The US government had the capacity to achieve a variety of different goals through a plethora of methods, however, it chose to remain within the confined framework of the political economy of the US, which supports its continued existence, because it was seen as the \u2018most appropriate\u2019 measures to be take. Alone, neither agents nor structures have sole constitutive power in determining social and political functions because they both have the capacity to influence one another.<\/p>\n

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References<\/h1>\n

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  1. Archer, M.S. (1995).Realist Social Theory: The Morphgenetic Approach, Cambridge University Press.\n
      \n
    1. Bachrach, P and Baratz, M. (1962). Two faces of power, American Political Science Review<\/em> 56: 947-952.<\/li>\n
    2. Berg, A. (1980). Critical Theory: Is There Still Hope? The American Journal of Sociology<\/i>, Vol. 86 No. 3, pp. 449-478.<\/li>\n
    3. Dahl, Robert (1957) Decision-making in a democracy: The supreme court as a national policy-maker, Journal of Public Law<\/em> 6: 279-295.<\/li>\n
    4. Dahl, Robert (1961) Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City<\/em>, New Haven, Yale University Press.<\/i><\/li>\n
    5. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform<\/em> and Consumer Protection<\/a> Act. (2010). Accessed from: www.sec.gov\/about\/laws\/wallstreetreform-cpa.pdf<\/a>. Retrieved 15\/10\/12.<\/cite><\/li>\n
    6. Giddens, A. (1984). The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration. Cambridge, Polity Press.<\/i> 250-259.<\/li>\n
    7. Giddens, A. (1976). New Rules of Sociological Method. Standford University Press<\/i><\/li>\n
    8. Hay, C. (1995). \u2018Structure and Agency\u2019, in D.Marsh&G.Stoker (eds), Theory and Methods in Political Science<\/i>, Macmillan. 189.<\/li>\n
    9. 10.\u00a0 <\/i>Heine A. and Kaspersen L.\u00a0 (2000). Classical and Modern Social Theory.<\/i> Blackwell publishers, Oxford<\/i>.<\/i><\/li>\n
    10. Hinson and Healey (2003) \u2018Building Political Power\u2019, prepared for the State Strategies Fund Convening, Grassroots Policy Project.<\/i> Accessed from: http:\/\/www.powercube.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2011\/04\/powerpack-web-version-2011.pdf<\/a>. Retrieved 15\/10\/12.<\/li>\n
    11. Jessop, J. (1990), State Theory: Putting Capitalist States in their Place, Polity<\/i>.<\/li>\n
    12. Hinson, S\u00a0and Healey, R.\u00a0(2003). \u2018Building Political Power\u2019, prepared for the State Strategies Fund Convening, Grassroots Policy Project.<\/li>\n
    13. Lasswell, H. (1937). Politics:Who Gets What, When, How. New York.<\/i><\/li>\n
    14. Loyal, S. and Barnes, B. (2001). Agency as a Red Herring in Social Theory, Philosophy of the Social Sciences,<\/i> 31[4]. 507-524.<\/li>\n
    15. Lukes, (1974), Power: A Radical View,<\/em> London, Macmillan<\/i> (reprinted 2005, Basingstoke, Palgrave Mcmillan).<\/li>\n
    16. McAnulla, S. (1998). The Structure-Agency Debate and its Historiographical Utility, University of Birmingham<\/i>. \u00a0Accessed from: http:\/\/www.psa.ac.uk\/journals\/pdf\/5\/1998\/mcanulla.pdf<\/a>. Retrieved 10\/10\/12.<\/li>\n
    17. Polsby (1963) Community Power and Political Theory<\/em>, New Haven, Yale University Press<\/i>.<\/li>\n
    18. Rolling Stone Politics, (2012). How Wall Street Killed Financial Reform. Accessed from: http:\/\/www.rollingstone.com\/politics\/news\/how-wall-street-killed-financial-reform-20120510<\/a>. Retrieved 15\/10\/12.<\/li>\n
    19. Schattschneider, Elmer, E. (1960) The Semisovereign People: A Realist\u2019s View of Democracy in America<\/em>, Harcourt Brace College Publishers.<\/li>\n
    20. Scott, B. (2006). Capitalism, Democracy and Development. Classical and Modern Social Theory<\/i>, Blackwell publishers, Oxford.<\/li>\n
    21. Standage, T. (2007). The Victorian Internet: The Remarkable Story of the Telegraph and the Nineteenth Century’s On-line Pioneers. Walker & Company<\/i>. 256<\/li>\n
    22. 23.\u00a0 <\/cite>Taylor, M. (1989). Structure, Culture, and Action. Politics & Society. 17[2] 115-162.<\/cite><\/li>\n
    23. <\/cite>Wendt, A. (1987). The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory. International Organization. 41. 335-370.<\/cite><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

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